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DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS AND
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE:
ZOBEL v. WILLIAMS
The right to migrate' often clashes with state regulation, especially
1 The Articles of Confederation explicitly recognized the right to migrate by
granting a citizen the right of "free ingress to and from any other state," yet the Con-
stitution contains no such provision. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV,
sec. 2, wth U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States"). Nevertheless, courts
recognize the right to migrate. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630
(1969).
The potential for a court to invoke the right to migrate and strike down state legis-
lation illustrates the power of judicial review. In short, the right to migrate acts as a
sword which a court can unsheath when necessary to trim the legislative power of
states. The sharpness of the sword depends on the applicable constitutional provision
governing judicial review, whether the court invokes the privileges and immunities
clause in article IV, the commerce clause, or the fourteenth amendment.
Under the Constitution, courts first examined the right to migrate in the context of
state discrimination against non-residents. Early cases suggested that discrimination
against non-residents contravened the privileges and immunities clause in article IV.
See Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 288, 293 (Md. 1797) (required treating simi-
larly the property of a non-resident with that of a resident). In Corfield v. Coryell, 6
F Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), Justice Bushrod Washington read the
privileges and immunities clause as securing "the right of a citizen of one state to pass
through, or to reside in, any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, profes-
sional pursuits, or otherwise." Id. at 552. Additionally, some courts read the clause
as only preventing a state from discriminating in favor of its own citizens and impos-
ing a burden on citizens of other states. See Wiley v. Parmer, 14 Ala. 627, 629 (1848);
Douglas v. Stephens, I Del. Ch, 465, 472-73 (1821).
Even in Corfeld, however, Justice Washington added an important caveat when he
noted that a state could, in furtherance of the general welfare, regulate immigration.
6 F. Cas. at 552. Justice Washington's caveat in Corfeld reflected a tradition of al-
lowing communities to exclude paupers. See Berger, Residence Requirementsfor Wel-
fare and Voting: A Post-Mortem, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 855-56 (1981). Fourteen years
after Corleld, the Supreme Court in New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837), recog-
nized New York's right to fenceout unwanted aliens. See also Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (while health laws excluding criminals, vagabonds, and pau-
pers might pass constitutional muster as valid public welfare regulations, such laws
implicate the commerce clause); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625
(1842) (dicta that states may exclude paupers). Dissenting in the Passenger Cases,
Chief Justice Taney agreed that states could close off their borders.
[T]he several States have a right to remove from among their people, and to
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when that regulation distinguishes among citizens according to the
prevent from entering the State, any person, or class or description of persons,
whom it may deem dangerous or injurious to the interests and welfare of its
citizens; and that the State has the exclusive right to determine, in its sound dis-
cretion, whether the danger does or does not exist, free from the control of the
general government.
48 U.S. (7 How.) at 467. But Chief Justice Taney added that a state could not enact a
tax on American citizens migrating into the state. Id. at 492.
These cases, however, only illustrate the Court's reliance on the commerce clause.
Specifically, the Court asked whether migrating people constituted commerce. Id. at
476-77. After the Court resolved the question affirmatively, the commerce clause
proved a potent weapon for protecting the right to travel. See Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160 (1941); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 436 (1935) (Stone, J., dissent-
ing); Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 251 (1929); Henderson v. Mayor of New
York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875); The Case of the State Freight Tax 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232
(1873); the License cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847); Erie Railway Co. v. State, 31
N.J. 531 (1864); Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534 (1862).
In 1868, the Supreme Court adopted an alternate rationale for protecting the right
to travel. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868). In place of the commerce
clause, the Crandall Court revitalized the earlier individual rights argument under the
privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 40-44. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler,
254 U.S. 281, 296 (1920) (privileges and immunities clause in article IV is similar to
provision in the Articles of Confederation); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274
(1900) ("undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to
another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right,
ordinarily, of a free transit from or through the territory of any State is a right secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment and by the Constitution"); Blake v. McClung, 172
U.S. 239, 256 (1898) ("The Constitution forbids only such legislation affecting citizens
of the respective States as will substantially or practically put a citizen of one State in
a condition of alienage when he is within or when he removes to another State, or
when asserting in another State the right that commonly appertains to those who are
part of the political community."); Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315 (1889) (privilege of
a United States citizen to transfer his citizenship from one state to another); Ward v.
Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871) (right to travel found in the privileges
and immunities clause in article IV); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869)
(right to travel in privileges and immunities clause in article IV). But cf. Railroad Co.
v. Husen, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 465, 470 (1877) (apparently construing the taxation of
persons interstate as a burden on commerce). Seegenerally C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION,
1864-1888 1302-07 (1971).
Although not tied to a single provision in the Constitution, freedom to travel re-
ceived increasing support during the twentieth century. See Zobel v. Williams, 102 S.
Ct. 2309, 2312 n.6 (1982) (although repeatedly recognized, the source of the right to
travel is obscure); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981) (found only a "qualified" right
to travel once an individual commits a certain crime); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1,
4 (1978) (recognized that the denial of vital benefits unconstitutionally burdened the
right of interstate travel); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86 n.26 (1976) (while states
may not burden a citizen's right to travel interstate, Congress may deter the travel of
aliens into the United States); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (the
right to travel need not be limited to a particular constitutional provision). For a
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length of their residency.2 Quite often states impose durational resi-
dency requirements3 on newly arrived migrants. These requirements
discussion of Shapiro and similar cases, see infra notes 22-91 and accompanying text.
For additional cases prior to Shapiro, see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58
(1966) (freedom to travel a fundamental right); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965)
(freedom to travel abroad is a fundamental right protected by the due process clause
in the fifth amendment); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964)
(freedom to travel abroad); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 25-26 (1958) (freedom to
travel abroad); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (commerce clause prohib-
its California from closing its borders to indigents). In short, the Supreme Court has
read into the rights of United States citizenship the freedom to travel. See generally
Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 (1956); J.
KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 (1978); A.
LIEN, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); Antieau, Paul's
Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1967); Berger, supra; Kurland, The Privileges
or Immunities Clause- "Its Hour Come Round at Last?", 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405;
Meyers, Federal Privileges and Immunities: Application to Ingress and Egress, 29 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 489 (1944); Roback, Legal Barriers to Interstate Migration, 28 CORNELL
L.Q. 286 (1943); Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1129 (1975).
2. For some recent examples, see In re United States ex rel. Missouri State High
School Activities Ass'n, 682 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1982) (one-year residency requirement
under the student athlete transfer eligibility rule); Akron v. Bell, 660 F.2d 166 (6th
Cir. 1981) (one-year residency requirement for city councilman); Walsh v. Louisiana
High School Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1980) (student transfer rule); Joseph v.
Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (one-year residency requirement
for city commissioner). See also IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-3-21-3 (Bums 1982) (resi-
dency requirement for individuals or corporations applying for a permit to sell alco-
holic beverages); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 243.105-243.107 (1980) (residency requirements
for wholesalers of an alcoholic beverage). Additionally, legislation can distinguish
among citizens on the basis of a specific date of residency. See, e.g., Amador Valley
Joint High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281,
149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978) (change from current value system of taxation to acquisition
value method of taxation-new residents pay a greater property tax than do old
residents).
3. Simple residency requirements differ from durational residency requirements.
In the former, a state requires only actual residency; in the latter, a state requires the
resident to wait a specified period before receiving certain public benefits. See, e.g.,
McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Commi'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (simple residency
requirements are constitutional).
Both types of requirements, however, may have the same practical effect on indi-
viduals, For instance, a simple residency requirement for admission to the bar places
the same burden on the non-resident seeking to practice law in the state as does a
durational residency requirement. In both cases, the lawyer must overcome an obsta-
cle before practicing his profession in the state. Because simple residency require-
ments distinguish non-residents from residents, while durational residency
requirements differentiate among residents based on the time of their arrival in the
state, courts sometimes employ different constitutional provisions. Compare Stalland
1983]
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create a waiting period before newcomers receive the full panoply of
state benefits. As states begin to play a more active role in providing
benefits and services,4 these requirements-classifications between
recent migrants and others-take on added significance. Reviewing a
novel type of durational residency requirement, the Supreme Court
in Zobel v. Williams5 displayed its dislike for certain durational resi-
dency requirements when it seemingly applied a new standard of re-
view and struck down an Alaska statute as violative of the equal
protection clause.
In Zobel, petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Alaska's
permanent fund income distribution statute.6 Unparalleled in the
American tradition,7 the Alaska statute provided for the distribution
v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155 (D.S.D. 1982) (simple resi-
dency requirement) with Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971)
(durational residency requirement) and Kennan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F.
Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (durational residency requirement).
4. On January 26, 1982, President Reagan delivered his State of the Union Ad-
dress in which he outlined a new era of federal-state relations. Reagan, State of the
Union Address, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Feb. 15, 1982, at 258. Initially, Presi-
dent Reagan proposed transferring such programs as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps to the state level. Id. at 260, 262. While Con-
gress has thus far balked at such transfers, the executive policy foreshadows the prom-
inent role the states may play in providing benefits and services.
5. 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982).
6. ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.23.010-.100 (Supp. 1980). The Alaska legislature devel-
oped a distribution scheme based solely on length of residency. Id. See infra note 8.
For a discussion of the distribution plan as a privitization statute, see generally Note,
Public Wealth, Privitization and the Constitution: The Alaska Example, 61 B.U.L.
REv. 969 (1981). See infra note 7, for further discussion of privitization theory.
Additionally, Alaska used the durational residency requirement in other situations,
and some of the requirements were challenged in the Alaska Supreme Court. Wil-
liams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1980) (invalidating a tax exemption statute dis-
criminating against new residents); Castner v. Homer, 598 P.2d 953 (Alaska 1979)
(sustaining a one-year durational residency requirement for a city officer); Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977), rev'don other grounds, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (one-
year durational residency requirement for employment on the Alaska pipeline viola-
tive of the equal protection clause); Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1974)
(three-year residency requirement for state senator upheld); State v. Adams, 522 P.2d
1125 (Alaska 1974) (one-year residency requirement for bringing divorce action un-
constitutional); State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1973) (one-year residency re-
quirement for public employment unconstitutional); State v. Van Dort, 502 P.2d 453
(Alaska 1972) (seventy-five day residency requirement for voting unconstitutional).
See generally infra note 8, for a description of the "Alaska experience."
7. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 463 (Alaska 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2309
(1982). The distribution plan marks a radical step toward recognizing the viability of
privitization theory. "Privitization involves a transfer to the private sector of wealth
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of earnings from the fund to residents based on their length of resi-
dency since statehood.' The Zobels, recent migrants to Alaska, al-
leged that the state plan denied equal treatment to bona fide citizens
because it treated newcomers differently than long-term residents.9
previously controlled by the public sector. Yet privitization is more than a grandiose
giveaway scheme. Rather, it is a philosophy of political economy that uses a broad
range of measures to enhance the private sector's role through minimal governmental
presence." Note, supra note 6, at 971. Privitization can take many forms. For in-
stance, "a state may simply forego tax collection or reduce tax rates, and use resource
rents to purchase public goods and services normally funded by tax levies. Alterna-
tively, a mineral-rich state like Alaska may transfer excess income and rents directly
to state residents." Id. In a less drastic form, privitization may entail governmental
divestiture of governmental operations. Id. Whatever form it takes, privitization the-
ory "rests upon an unquestioned faith in free enterprise." Id. at 972. A key problem
with pnvitization plans, however, comes during the distribution stage-just who gets
how much? A state must account for the possible massive immigration which could
occur if the benefits are distributed equally to old and new residents. Id. at 972-73.
8. The rationality of Alaska's distribution scheme must be judged in light of
Alaska's peculiar history. "After literally centuries of non-existent governmental
services and widespread poverty," the state discovered a large oil field in 1967 which
promised "'economic salvation for the State." Brief for Appellee at 3, Zobel v. Wil-
hams, 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982). See generally C. NASKE, AN INTERPRETiVE HISTORY
oF ALASKA STATEHOOD (1973), and E. GRUENING, THE STATE OF ALASKA (1968) for
a historical background. The promise proved gratifying when the state began to re-
ceive 'a massive infusion of revenue." Brief for Appellee at 3, Zobel v. Williams, 102
S. Ct. 2309. As Alaska became wealthier, people flocked to the state, many to work
on the pipeline. In fact, between 1972 and 1973, Alaska's population increased by
eleven percent. Note, Durational Residency Requirements: The Alaska Experience, 6
U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 50, n.2 (1976). The situation changed dramatically by
1975, unforeseen problems had halted construction on the pipeline, and the state be-
gan facing a large budget deficit. Thus sensitized to the problems of an economy
based on finite natural resources, Alaskans passed a constitutional amendment estab-
lishing a permanent fund designed to outlive Alaska's oil reserves. Brief for Appellee
at 4-5, Zobel v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. 2309.
The statute at issue in Zobel v. Williams distributes a percentage of the interest
from the permanent fund to Alaska residents, eighteen years or older, and "state resi-
dent[s] during all or part of the year for which the permanent fund dividend is paid."
ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.23.010-.100, 43.23.020 (Supp. 1980). Each eligible person re-
ceives "one permanent fund dividend for each full year that the individual is a state
resident after January 1, 1959." Id. Additionally, the plan provides for distributing
funds to residents of less than a year on a prorated basis. Id. § 43.23.010(8). For the
1979 fiscal year, each dividend was worth fifty dollars. Zobel, 102 S. Ct. at 2311.
While the constitutionality of Alaska's distribution scheme was pending before the
United States Supreme Court, the Alaska legislature passed a new act in the event the
Court declared the initial plan unconstitutional. The Governor signed the new act on
June 16, 1982, two days after Zobel was handed down. Alaska's new plan provides
for equal dividends to all State residents who have been a resident for the immedi-
ately preceding six months. 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws Ch. 102 §§ 1-30.
9. Zobel, 102 S. Ct. at 2312. Appellant's brief argued, inter alia, that recent mi-
19831
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Furthermore, they claimed that the statute penalized their exercise of
the right to travel.' The Alaska Supreme Court rejected these argu-
ments,' but the United States Supreme Court reversed, declaring the
grants belong to a "suspect" class. Brief for Appellants at 18-20, 46, Zobel v. Wil-
liams, 102 S. Ct. 2309. See McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions-Fundamental
Right to Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 1007
(1975). Language in the opinions prior to Zobel suggests that recent migrants may
comprise a suspect class. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 64. But cf infra note
56. If the Court views recent migrants as a suspect class, explaining why penalties
imposed on recent migrants might not trigger strict scrutiny poses a problem. Id.
10. Zobel, 102 S. Ct. at 2311.
11. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448 (Alaska 1980) (Zobel II), rev'd, 102 S. Ct.
2309 (1982). ZobelIl was an appeal from the summary judgment of a superior court.
Id. at 450. The superior court declared the plan a denial of equal protection of the
laws and an infringement on the right to interstate migration. Id. The Alaska
Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment and upheld the statute under a bal-
ancing test. Id.
The Zobels also challenged Alaska's tax exemption statute. Williams v. Zobel, 619
P.2d 422 (Alaska 1980) (Zobel I). The Alaska legislature passed the tax exemption
statute during the same session as the permanent fund income distribution statute.
Id. at 423-24. The exemption "completely exempts from taxation the income of those
individuals who have filed an Alaska income tax return and reported gross income
from sources within Alaska for three or more years." Id. Furthermore, "[t]hose who
have filed tax returns in two previous years are exempt from two-thirds of the tax that
would ordinarily be levied under the existing structure, and those that have filed in
one previous year are exempt from one-third of their tax." Id. at 424. The Zobels
argued that the statute denied them equal treatment under the Alaska Constitution.
Id.
In striking down the exemption, the Alaska Supreme Court analogized the tax ex-
emption to a durational residency requirement: "[D]iscrimination against new resi-
dents created by the series of exemptions is apparent from the statute. Therefore, the
legal question presented is whether Alaska may selectively impose an income tax on
new residents." Id. at 425. Quite aptly, the court drew the connection between the
equal protection clause and the right to travel.
The relationship between these two constitutional protections, which may not be
immediately clear, is that a durational residency requirement does not treat
equally those individuals who have recently exercised their constitutional right to
travel and those who have not. Individuals who belong to that class of people
who have recently migrated to a state are denied certain rights and benefits
granted to other residents. In effect, the argument is that a durational residency
requirement impermissibly penalizes those who have exercised a constitutional
right.
Id.
The Zobel I court found no federally protected fundamental right and therefore
applied a balancing test to the exemption. Id. at 427. Under this test, the court held
that the statute violated the state constitution. Id. at 429. For commentary on the
case, see Note, Balancing Test in Durational Residence Equal Protection Analysis, 56
WASH. L. REv. 763 (1981); Note, supra note 6.
As in Zobel I, the Alaska Supreme Court in Zobel 1H measured the permanent
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distribution scheme a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. I2
When Congress drafted the fourteenth amendment, 13 the amend-
fund income distribution statute against a balancing test. In previous cases, the
Alaska court had interpreted United States Supreme Court decisions as mandating
the application of strict scrutiny analysis when the state imposes a durational resi-
dency requirement. Zobel 11, 619 P.2d at 452. Subsequently, however, the Alaska
Supreme Court abandoned the old two-tier approach to equal protection analysis and
adopted a balancing test. Id. at 452.
The Zobel H court began by noting that the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized that not all durational residency requirements penalized the exercise of the right
to interstate migration. Id. at 454. Absent such a penalty, strict scrutiny analysis was
inapplicable. Id. After concluding that the statute--though a multi-stage durational
residency requirement-fell within the principles governing two-stage durational resi-
dency requirements, the Zobel I1 court considered whether the statute operated as a
penalty triggering strict scrutiny. Id. at 454-55. The Zobel II court measured the
penalty indirectly by examining four factors which the United States Supreme Court
indicated might trigger strict scrutiny: 1) state justification of administrative conven-
ience; 2) benefit denied considered a basic necessity; 3) state merely delaying receipt
of benefit; and 4) state denies fundamental right to new resident. Id. at 455-57. The
court held that the distribution plan fell outside each factor. Id. Finding the balanc-
ing approach applicable, the court then examined the objectives of the distribution
plan and sustained the act.
12. Zobel, 102 S. Ct. 2309.
13. At first, the passage of the fourteenth amendment meant little in the develop-
ment of securing more rights. The amendment merely broadened the class of effected
individuals and did not interfere with the well established triparte classification of
rights: 1) civil rights which the amendment covered; 2) social rights which the
amendment did not cover, and 3) political rights which the amendment did not reach.
See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). The amendment, by making national citizenship
independent from state citizenship, secured the pre-existing rights of national citizen-
ship against state attack. See Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1954). For a general survey of the literature on the history of the
fourteenth amendment, see R. BERGER, supra; R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-
SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); C. FAIRMAN, supra note 1; H. FLACK,
THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); R. HARRIS, THE QUEST
FOR EQUALITY (1960); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1956); B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUC-
TION (1914); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); L. LuSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?: A
COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION
(1975); J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965); Benedict, Preserving Federalism:
Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39; Benedict, Preserving the
Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. AM. HIST. 65
(1974); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1955); Boudin, Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 N.Y.U.
L.Q. 19 (1938); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). Currently, some
scholars are engaged in re-examining history. See, e.g., Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a
19831
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ment scarcely embraced the corpus of meaning engrafted into the
provision by subsequent generations. 14 In particular, the equal pro-
tection clause served only a secondary purpose until the demise of
substantive due process. 5 During the Stone and Vincent Courts,
Limitation on State Authority: .4 Repy to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
45 (1980); Diamond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination
Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds,
80 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1982).
14. The scope of current equal protection analysis far exceeds the treatment that
the clause received during the nineteenth century. A survey of the major articles on
equal protection is illustrative. See generally Blattner, Supreme Court's "Intermedi-
ate" Equal Protection Decisions: Five Imperfect Models of Constitutional Equality, 8
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 777 (1981); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Fore.
word- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Leedes, The Rationality Requirement of
the Equal Protection Clause, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 639 (1981); Miller & Bowman, Toward
an Interstate Standard of Equal Protection of the Laws: .4 Speculative Essay, 1981
B.Y.U. L. REV. 275; Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Pro-
tection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J.
1071 (1974); O'Fallon,A4djudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Pro-
tection, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 19 (1979); Park, Thinking About Equal Protection, 57 U.
DET. J. URB. L. 961 (1980); Perry, Constitutional "Fairness:" Notes on Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process, 63 VA. L. REV. 383 (1977); Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979); Torke, The Judicial
Process in Equal Protection Cases, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 279 (1982); Wilkinson,
The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and The Three Faces of Constitu-
tional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975).
15. Following the Civil War, and until the middle 1930's, the due process clause
in the fourteenth amendment overshadowed the equal protection clause. Generally,
the Court's inquiry centered on two areas. First, the Court examined the scope of the
state's police power. In McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909), the Court articu-
lated its attitude toward state regulation.
If the law in controversy has a reasonable relation to the protection of the public
health, safety or welfare it is not to be set aside because the judiciary may be of
opinion that the act will fail of its purpose, or because it is thought to be an
unwise exertion of the authority vested in the legislative branch of the
Government.
Id. at 547-48. Second, the due process clause served as the strongest barrier against
state regulation. The Court invoked the due process clause when a state threatened to
take private property. For a discussion of the use of the due process clause, see A.
PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND
BENCH, 1887-1895 (1976); B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1980). Rate regulation during the turn of the century illustrates the primary impor-
tance of the due process clause. If the state levied an unreasonable rate against a
company, the Court treated the issue as a deprivation of property without due pro-
cess. Only secondarily would the Court add that "in so far as it is thus deprived,
while other persons are permitted to receive reasonable profits upon their invested
capital, the company is deprived of the equal protection of the laws." Cotting v. Kan-
sas City Stock Yards Co. & C., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
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however, the equal protection clause began its climb toward becom-
ing a potent constitutional hurdle. 6 By the end of Chief Justice
Warren's tenure on the Court, equal protection review embodied
three tenets. First, the Court deferred to legislative judgments con-
cerning social and economic programs.17 Second, the Court ex-
amined closely certain suspect classifications.18 Third, the Court
applied a strict scrutiny analysis to classifications impinging upon the
exercise of a fundamental right.'9 The Burger Court purportedly fol-
lows this triparte model.2'
Shortly before Warren Burger replaced Earl Warren as Chief Jus-
tice, the Court enlarged the fundamental rights strand of equal pro-
tection analysis by retrieving right to travel analysis from the
commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause in the
fourteenth amendment2 and bringing it within the ambit of the
equal protection clause. The Court has developed three approaches
16. See generally R. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 28-126 (1972).
17. An early case illustrating judicial deference concerning social and economic
regulation is Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). In Lindsley,
Justice Van Devanter stated the appropriate guidelines for equal protection review.
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take
from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of
the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done
only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that
clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality. When the classification in such a law is
called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must
be assumed.
Id. at 78. Virtually intact, the Warren Court adopted this approach toward economic
and social regulations. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
But c. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled by New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297 (1976); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at
677-78 (10th ed. 1980) (the Warren Court required a modicum of rationality).
18. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 17, at 671.
19 Id
20. The Burger Court purportedly follows this triparte model. See, e.g., G.D.
Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404 (1982) Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230
(1981); Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587-94 (1979); Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 111 (1979); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 54 n.17 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). See supra note
14 for secondary material concerning the equal protection clause.
21. See infra notes 22-40 and accompanying text.
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for evaluating the constitutionality of durational residency require-
ments under the equal protection clause: (1) does the statute operate
as a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel; (2) does the statute
operate as an irrebuttable presumption; and (3) does the balance of
interests weigh more heavily in favor of the individual than in favor
of the state? The Zobel Court departed from these approaches, but a
look at the Court's meandering path back to the beginning is
warranted.
The Court demonstrated use of the first two approaches in Shapiro
v. Thompson.22 In Shapiro, the Court reviewed the constitutionality
of three statutes conditioning the receipt of public assistance benefits
on a one year residency requirement. 23 The challengers of the stat-
22. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
23. Id. at 622, 623, 625. Shapiro involved statutes from the District of Columbia,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut. Id. For commentary on the case, see Rosenheim,
Shapiro v. Thompson: "The Beggars are Coming to Town," 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 303;
Samford, The Burger Court andSocial Welfare Cases, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 813, 815
(1980); Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972
Sup. CT. REV. 41; The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 62, 118 (1969);
Note, Residence Requirements After Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 134
(1970); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Wefare and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 989 (1969); Comment, supra note 1.
Contemporaneous with Shapiro, courts began invalidating residency requirements
conditioning the allocation of public assistance benefits. Compare People ex rel.
Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 30 N.E.2d 46 (1940) (upholding the state's interest
in protecting the "public purse" by allowing the state to impose a durational resi-
dency requirement to discourage indigents from entering the state) with Green v. De-
partment of Public Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173, 177 (D. Del. 1967) (discouraging
indigents an impermissible purpose). See, e.g., Baxter v. Birkins, 311 F. Supp. 222
(D. Colo. 1970) (one-year residency requirement for welfare assistance held unconsti-
tutional); Bryson v. Burson, 308 F. Supp 1170 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (one-year residency
requirement for public assistance benefits held unconstitutional); Gaddis v. Wyman,
304 F. Supp. 717 (N.D.N.Y. 1969) (court held unconstitutional a statute which cre-
ated a presumption that residents of less than one year entered the state for the pur-
pose of obtaining public assistance benefits and were therefore ineligible), afld sub
nom., Wyman v. Bowers, 397 U.S. 49 (1970); Bums v. Montgomery, 299 F. Supp.
1002 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (injunctive relief available against statute imposing a one-year
residency requirement for public assistance benefits); Denny v. Health & Social Serv.
Bd., 285 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (one-year residency requirement for assistance
a violation of equal protection); Robertson v. Ott, 284 F. Supp. 735 (D. Mass. 1968)
(one-year residency requirement for AFDC benefits,lacks a reasonable basis and thus
contravenes the equal protection clause); Harrell v. Tobiner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D. D.C.
1967), ajfd sub nom., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Ramos v. Health
and Social Serv. Bd., 276 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Wis. 1967). But sf. Waggoner v. Rosenn,
286 F. Supp. 275 (M.D. Pa. 1968) (one-year residency requirement for public assist-
ance grants constitutional). Prior to Shapiro, courts invalidating durational residency
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utes argued that the denial of Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) benefits solely because of a failure to satisfy the one
year waiting period deprived bona fide citizens of equal protection of
the law.24 In response, the proponents offered four justifications for
requirements for public assistance benefits generally relied upon the lack of reasona-
bleness in the statutes. Ramos is illustrative:
By definition, the one-year residence requirement is not a waiting period
required of all applicants. Whatever arguments might be legitimately made in
favor of a waiting period required of every applicant, regardless of length of
residence, they can not reasonably be used to support a provision whereby aids
are denied to all needy and otherwise eligible applicants who have resided in the
state less than one year and granted to applicants similarly situated with respect
to need and eligibility, but who have resided here for more than one year.
Ramos, 276 F. Supp. at 477. Additionally, the Ramos court admitted the incidental
effect on interstate travel created by the durational residency requirement, but added
that "it is significant that the majority [in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941),
discussed supra note 1] concluded that the state's desire to protect its treasury from
applications for aid by recent arrivals, did not justify interference with interstate
movement." Id. For residency requirements prior to Shapiro, see Harvith, The Con-
stitutionality of Residence Testsfor General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 567 (1966); LoGatto, Residence Laws-A Step Forward or Backward?,
7 CATH. LAW. 101 (1961); Mandelker, The Settlement Requirement in GeneralAssist-
ance, 1955 WASH. U. L.Q. 355, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 21; Note, Residence Requirements
in State Public Welfare Statutes, 51 IowA L. REv. 1080 (1966).
24. 394 U.S. at 627. Justice Brennan described the effect of the classification:
[Tihe effect of the waiting-period in each case is to create two classes of needy
resident families indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed
of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who
have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. On the basis of this sole differ-
ence the first class is granted and the second class is denied welfare aid upon
which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to sub-
sist-food, shelter, and other necessities of life.
394 U.S. at 627.
The Supreme Court received amicus curia briefs; each brief, however, focused on
three issues; 1) the importance of AFDC benefits; 2) empirical studies illustrating the
impact on migration, coupled with the constitutional right to travel; and 3) the estab-
lishment of an irrebuttable presumption as to why the migrant entered the state. P.
KURLAND & G. CASPER, LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 68 (1975). In oral argument,
Solicitor General Archibald Cox tied the major arguments together. First, Mr. Cox
emphasized the importance of the AFDC benefits. Second, he stressed that the classi-
fication "rested on a prejudice against outsiders." 1d. at 387. Third, he argued that
the classification lacked a "substantial relation to the accomplishment of any permis-
sible State policy." Id. On the second day of oral argument, Mr. Cox delivered a
passionate plea in favor or protecting the right to travel:
[W]e have a situation in which the state has singled out for the purposes of disfa-
vor and hostile treatment those who exercise the fundamental liberty of moving
to a new residence in pursuit of better opportunities, better life, or what else they
consider to be an advantage. That discrimination, we say, is not merely capri-
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the residency requirements: (1) to protect the fiscal integrity of the
governmental unit by discouraging potential recipients from entering
the jurisdiction;25 (2) to discourage indigents from entering the juris-
diction for the purpose of receiving aid;26 (3) to allocate resources on
the basis of contributions to the community;27 and (4) to facilitate
administrative convenience and encourage new residents to look for
jobs. 28 The Court held the statutes unconstitutional under all of the
asserted objectives.29
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan responded to each of the
justifications with a separate rationale. 30 He rejected the initial pur-
pose as having a constitutionally impermissible goal-that of penaliz-
ing the exercise of the right to travel.3 ' The Court had held
consistently that the state could not purposely chill 32 the exercise of a
cious, but it is invidious in the same sense that discrimination on grounds of race
or religion is invidious. And it also operates to deter the exercise of a right which
underlies a number of the provisions of the Constitution.
Id. at 390.
Cox might have bolstered his argument by pointing out that an exemption existed
for those who entered the state and had "a bona fide job offer or are self-supporting
upon arrival in the State and for three months thereafter." 394 U.S. at 622. Clearly,
the statute not only classified according to time of residency, but also according to
wealth. But cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (wealth not a suspect class
and welfare benefits not a fundamental right). Moreover, lurking behind the fact
situation in Shapiro lay the emerging area of governmental entitlements. See, e.g.,
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (a welfare reciprient's benefits cannot be ter-
minated without due process). The Court decided Kelly during the same term as
Dandridge and Shapiro. In Kelly, the Court held that welfare benefits amounted to a
property interest protected by the due process clause. Id. at 262-65. For material
discussing governmental entitlements, see Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Propert,"
62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977); Terrel, "Property," "Due Process," and the Distinc-
tion Between Denition and Theory in Legal .4nalysis, 70 GEo. L.J. 861 (1982);
Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestionfor the Revival of Substantive Due Process,
1975 Sup. CT. REv. 261; Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property." Adjudicative
Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977).
25. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627-28.
26. Id. at 631.
27. Id. at 632. "Appellants argue ... that the challenged classification may be
sustained as an attempt to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of
the contribution they have made to the community through the payment of taxes."
Id.
28. Id. at 633-34.
29. See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
30. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
31. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.
32. A state cannot chill the exercise of a fundamental right. See, e.g., United
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constitutional right.3" Justice Brennan found the second justification
unreasonable in light of the over-inclusive classification; the one-year
waiting period created an irrebuttable presumption that all newly ar-
rived indigents entered the jurisdiction to obtain greater benefits.34
Additionally, the rationale of conditioning benefits based on past
contributions to the community posed two problems. First, the "past
contribution argument" had no basis in fact.35 Second, the Court
invoked the "parade-of-horribles" argument36 cautioning that the
same justification might allow state apportionment of other benefits
and services.3 7
When reviewing the last objective, Justice Brennan heightened the
scope of equal protection analysis.38 If a classification penalized the
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (unconstitutional to chill both the exercise
of the fifth amendment right not to plead guilty and the sixth amendment right to a
jury tmal); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Virginia's poll tax
struck down); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (freedom of religion and
expression may not be "infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a
benefit or pnvilege"): Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) (freedom of
expression may not be deterred by a state's general taxing program without justifica-
tion). Not until the twentieth century, with the demise of the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions and the abandonment of the "right"-"privilege" distinction, did this
judicial attitude gain ascendancy. See generaly Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and
Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); Van Alstyne, supra note 24.
33 In Shapiro, the right to travel served as the constitutional right. 394 U.S. at
629.
34. Id. at 631.
35. Id. at 632. Justice Brennan questioned whether long-term residents did make
a greater contribution through taxes than newer residents. Both classes were indi-
gents. Moreover, he noted that in Pennsylvania 40% of those denied benefits "had
lengthy pnor residence in the State." Id.
36. This type of argument exemplified the Waite and Fuller Court's jurispru-
dence. Uniformly the Justices on these courts reasoned that if they allowed the state
to enforce "T," then the state would follow suit with "X" and "Y" and "Z."
37. 394 U.S. at 632-33. Without citation or explanation, Justice Brennan opined
that the equal protection clause prohibits the apportionment of benefits and services.
Otherwise, states might bar new residents from public facilities, or they might allocate
all benefits and services according to a citizen's past tax contributions. Id.
38. See supra notes 27, 35-37 and accompanying text. Shapiro illustrates the War-
ren Court's expansion of the traditional areas for invoking a strict scrutiny analysis of
classifications. See, e.g., Mogk v. Detroit, 335 F. Supp. 698, 700 (E.D. Mich. 1971)
(declined to apply the "reasonableness" test, concluding that "[i]t appears to us, how-
ever. that not only the Supreme Court of the United States but the Congress as well
has discarded the 'reasonableness' test in favor of the 'compelling state interest' test").
See generally R. FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 58 (1977) ("In-
deed, Shapiro presented some troubling questions to those who remembered their
constitutional history. The thought processes and methods of analysis employed by
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exercise of the right to travel, the Court demanded that the state
prove the classification "necessary to promote a compelling govern-
mental interest.39 Furthermore, the "necessary" standard required
the state to adopt the least drastic means available.4 0
Although criticized,4' Shapiro provided a mandate for lower courts
to review the constitutionality of other durational residency require-
ments.42 These requirements inherently penalize those who have re-
the majority in Shapiro were strikingly similar to those which characterized the Court
during the heyday of substantive due process."); L. LUSKY, supra note 13, at 251
(Shapiro v. Thompson crystallized a broad rationalizing principle."); Mendelson, From
Warren to Burger. The Rise and Decline of Substantive Equal Protection, 66 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 1226 (1972); Park, supra note 14, at 993 ("In the waning years of the War-
ren Court, the Court expanded aggressively both branches of strict scrutiny, that of
the suspect class and that of fundamental rights."). Justice Harlan expressed a similar
attitude in his Shapiro dissent, see infra note 41.
39. 394 U.S. at 634. The Court did not holdper se infringements on the right to
travel unconstitutional; rather, it would declare the end illegitimate when the legisla-
turepurposely infringed on the right to travel. Absent that discriminatory purpose,
"any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to
be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id.
40. Id. at 637. For example, when responding to the claim that the requirement
safeguarded against fraud, Justice Brennan offered alternate means the two states
could have chosen. Id.
41. "Make no mistake about it," wrote one contemporary observer, "Lochner v.
New York is alive and well in Shapiro v. Thompson." Winter, supra note 23, at 102.
Ten years after Shapiro, Professor Michael Perry criticized the Court for implicating
the equal protection clause. Perry asserted that "while the line or classification of-
fended a constitutional norm, the right of interstate migration, it did not offend or
even implicate the principle of equal protection." Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979). See also The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 23, at 122-23.
Dissenting, Justice Harlan argued that the Court expanded its newly developed
"doctrine of the compelling state interest test." 394 U.S. at 655. Justice Harlan sug-
gested that in cases like Shapiro, when classifications are based on the exercise of a
constitutional right, the Court should employ the due process rather than the equal
protection clause. Id. at 658-59. Furthermore, Justice Harlan criticized what he per-
ceived as an expansion of fundamental rights. Id. at 661. He opined that "[v]irtually
every state statute affects important rights," and by expanding the realm of rights
subject to the compelling state interest test the Court acted like a "super-legislature."
Id.
42. Dissenting in Shapiro, Chief Justice Warren feared the Court opened the
floodgates:
The Court's decision reveals only the top of the iceberg. Lurking beneath are the
multitude of situations in which States have imposed residence requirements in-
cluding eligibility to vote, to engage in certain professions or occupations or to
attend a state-supported university. Although the Court takes pains to avoid ac-
knowledging the ramifications of its decision, its implication cannot be ignored.
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cently exercised their right to travel.43 Other types of requirements,
394 U.S. at 655.
With Shapiro as precedent, lower federal courts invalidated an array of residency
requirements conditioning receipt of public benefits. see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 376 (1972) (affirming lower court holding "that a State statute that de-
nies welfare benefits to resident aliens and one that denies them to aliens who have
not resided in the United States for a specified number of years violates the Equal
Protection Clause"); King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971) (five-year residency requirement for public
housing unconstitutional); Cole v. Housing Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir.
1970) (public housing); Barnes v. Board of Trustees, 369 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Mich.
1973) (five-year residency requirement for Michigan Veterans Trust Fund); Butler v.
Breyer, 355 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (one-year residency requirement for poor
relief unconstitutional); Carter v. Gallagher, 337 F. Supp. 626 (D. Minn. 1971) (dura-
tional residency requirement for veterans' preference statute); Besaw v. Affleck, 333 F.
Supp. 775 (D. R.I. 1971) (one-year residency requirement for public assistance bene-
fits invalidated); Stevens v. Campbell, 332 F. Supp. 102 (D. Mass. 1971) (residency
requirement for veterans' preference statute struck down); Rivera v. Dunn, 329 F.
Supp. 554 (D. Conn. 1971), aI'd, 404 U.S. 1054 (1972) (one-year requirement for
public assistance); Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz. 1971) (one-year
requirement for hospitalization or medical care in non-emergency cases declared un-
constitutional); Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. N.C. 1971) (four-month
residency requirement for obtaining therapeutic abortions unconstitutional); Arnold
v. Halifax Hosp. Dist., 314 F. Supp. 277 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (residency requirement for
medical care); Crapps v. Duval County Hosp. Auth., 314 F. Supp. 181 (M.D. Fla.
1970) (residency requirement for medical care); Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37
(D. Ariz. 1970), aftd, 400 U.S. 884 (1970) (residency requirement for medical care);
Passmore v. Birkins, 311 F. Supp. 588 (D. Colo. 1969) (statutes conditioning receipt of
AFDC and AND assistance unconstitutional); Sheard v. Department of Social Wel-
fare, 310 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Iowa 1969) (nine-year residency requirement for old-age
assistance unconstitutional); Morrison v. Vincent, 300 F. Supp. 541 (S.D. W.Va. 1969)
lone-year residency requirement for AFDC assistance unconstitutional).
43 As courts broadened the scope of the right to travel, land control programs
and exclusionary zoning practices received greater attention along with residency re-
quirements. While these types of regulations did not involve durational residency
requirements, the legal issues raised were a product of Shapiro. See Construction
Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934
(1976). See generall' Lamb & Lustig, The Burger Court, Exclusionary Zoning, and the
Activist-Restraintist Debate, 40 U. PiTT. L. REv. 169 (1979) (arguing that "right to
travel" analysis is not useful in challenging zoning ordinance); Comment, The Right
to Travel and Community Growth Controls, 12 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 244 (1975); Com-
ment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional Standardfor Local Land Use Regu-
lations?, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 612 (1972); 9 GA. L. REV. 260 (1974) ("right to travel"
analysis could have a profound impact on zoning and growth control).
Employment preference statutes also conflicted with right to travel analysis. See
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (privileges and immunities clause forbids dis-
criminatory hiring practices). But cf. White v. Massachusetts, 103 S.Ct. 1042 (1983)
(Commerce clause not violated by mayor's executive order "which required that all
construction projects funded in whole or in part by city funds. . . should be per-
formed by a work force consisting of at least half bonafide residents of Boston.") See
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therefore, received closer attention-such as bar admission require-
ments,44 divorce statutes,45 residency requirements for public of-
ficers, 46 tuition fee differentials for public schools, 47 and residency
generally Note, Domicile Preferences in Employment: The Case of,41aska Hire, 1978
DuKE L.J. 1069; Comment, Durational Residence Requirements/or Public Employ-
ment, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 386 (1979) (predicting that if penalty analysis survives Sosna
then the penalty will probably be determined by examining the individual interest).
44. See, e.g., Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (one-year
residency requirement for bar admission unconstitutional); Webster v. Wofford, 321
F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (one-year residency for bar admission unconstitu-
tional); Kennan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. N.C. 1970)
(twelve-month residency requirement for taking bar exam unconstitutional). Accord-
ing to one commentator, however:
Most courts have not extended Shapiro to void durational residence require-
ments for bar admissions. Lower courts have generally found that denying ad-
mission to the bar did not penalize the right to travel sufficiently to warrant the
application of strict scrutiny.
Note, Durational Residence Requirements From Shapiro Through Sosna" The Right to
Travel Takes a New Turn, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 622, 645 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Durational Residence Requirement]. See generally Note,A ConstitutionalAnaly-
sis of State Bar Residency Requirements Under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities
Clause ofArticle IV, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1461 (1979); Note, The ConstitutionaliY of
State Residency Requirements/orAdmission to the Bar, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 838 (1973);
Note, The Future of State Bar Residence Requirements Under the Privileges and Inttu-
nities Clause, 26 S.D.L. REV. 79 (1981). As these articles indicate, the challenges to
bar admission requirements usually center on the privileges and immunities clause in
article IV. Today, many bar admission regulations have a residency component.
These requirements are currently being challenged in the federal courts. See, e.g.,
Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 708 F.2d 825 (Ist Cir. 1983) (rehearing
en banc granted) In re Roberts, 682 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1982); Stalland v. South Dakota
Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155 (D.S.D. 1982); Lowrie v. Goldenhersh, 521 F.
Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aft'd, 716 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983).
45. Subsequent to Shapiro, some courts extended the penalty analysis to include
residency requirements for parties seeking a divorce. See Note, Durational Residence
Requirements, supra note 44, at 656. Additionally, for the Supreme Court's treat-
ment, see infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. Courts differ over whether such
statutes impose a penalty, or whether an important governmental interest is at stake.
Compare Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I. 1973) and Wymelenberg v.
Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971) and State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125
(Alaska 1974) and Monroe v. Monroe, 32 Ohio Misc. 129 (1972) with Makers v.
Askew, 500 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1974) and Caizza v. Caizza, 291 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 907 (1975).
46. The leading case is Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1972). In Green,
the court held a two-year residency requirement for a public officer unconstitutional.
After finding a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel, the court applied the
strict scrutiny test of Shapiro. Id. See, e.g., Headlee v. Franklin County Bd. of Elec-
tions, 368 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (three-year residency requirement for mayor
unconstitutional); Mogk v. Detroit, 335 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (three-year
residency requirement for membership to charter revision commission unconstitu-
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requirements for voter qualification.48
tional): Bolanowski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (three-year resi-
dency requirement for mayor unconstitutional absent compelling state interest).
Other courts apply a lesser standard of review. See, e.g., Akron v. Bell, 660 F.2d 166
(6th Cir. 1981); Joseph v. Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Russell
v. Hathaway, 423 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Tex. 1976). Additionally, two Supreme Court
summary affirmances indicate that these requirements may be less suspect than other
durational residency requirements. See Sununu v. Stark, 420 U.S. 958 (1975), af'g
383 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974); Chimento v. Stark, 414 U.S. 802 (1973), a?7'g 353 F.
Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973). See also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (judging
restriction on candidate in light of impact on voters). See generally LeClercqu, Dura-
tional Residency Requirementsfor Public Office, 27 S.C.L. REV. 847 (1976); Note, Du-
rational Residency Requirements for State and Local Office." A Violation of Equal
Protection?, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 996 (1972).
47. Courts usually find a legitimate state interest for imposing a durational resi-
dency requirement upon out-of-state students. The legitimate interest apparently ne-
gates the necessity for invoking the "compelling state interest" test. See, e.g., Sturgis
v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973), aff'd, 414 U.S. 1057 (1973);
Weaver v. Kelton, 357 F. Supp. 1106 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Stares v. Malkerson, 326 F.
Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971); Arizona Bd. of Regents v.
Harper, 108 Ariz. 223,495 P.2d 453 (1972); Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Ca. App. 2d
430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969),appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970). The Starns court
distinguished its case from Shapiro. Unlike in Shapiro, the Starns court rejected the
presence of any discriminatory purpose to exclude a class of people. Id. at 237.
Moreover, the court noted that " [tihere is no showing here that the one-year waiting
period has any dire effects on the nonresident student equivalent to those noted in
Shapiro." Id. at 238. Adopting the reasoning in Kirk v. Board of Regents, the Starns
court acknowledged the absence of a chilling effect on a fundamental right; thus, the
court failed to find a "penalty" requiring the invocation of the compelling state inter-
est test. Id. The court conceded, however, that the classification was discriminatory
and created an irrebuttable presumption. Id. at 238-39. Nevertheless, the court at-
tempted to explain that the presumption could be overcome. Id. at 240. The court's
logic fails. In short, it assumed away the presumption by asserting that the presump-
tion could be overcome after a year. Id. More importantly, however, the Starns court
accepted as a legitimate state interest the goal of cost equalization. Id. But in Zobel
v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982), the Supreme Court suggested that its summary
affirmance of Starns should not be read as an acceptance of cost equalization as a
valid state interest. Id. at 2315 n.13. The Zobel Court added that it considered the
requirement in Starns a test of bona fide residence. Id.
48. For the Supreme Court's treatment of these requirements, see infra notes 51-
55 and accompanying text. See also Meyers v. Jackson, 390 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Ark.
1975) (voter residency requirement unconstitutional absent compelling state interest);
Fisher v. Herseth, 374 F. Supp. 745 (D. S.D. 1974) (five-year United States and one
hundred and eighty-day state residency requirement unconstitutional); Moen v. Er-
landson, 80 Wash.2d 755, 498 P.2d 849 (1972) (one-year state and ninety-day county
voter residency requirement unconstitutional absent compelling state interest).
For the difficulty with drawing a line between the acceptable and unacceptable
residency requirement, see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (per curiam) (fifty-
day voter residency requirement for non-presidential elections constitutional); Burns
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The Court's next treatment of a state durational residency require-
ment came in a challenge to Tennessee's voter registration law. 9
While Shapiro focused on whether the classification penalized the ex-
ercise of the right to travel,50 this step served as a mere formality
when, in Dunn v. Blumstein,51 the Court suggested that all durational
residency requirements operated as a penalty. 2 The Dunn Court
held that a durational residency requirement for voting,53 imposed
on an otherwise potentially bona fide resident, penalized the exercise
of both the constitutional right to travel54 and the constitutional right
to equal opportunity to participate in the political process.55 Aside
from ambiguous dicta in Shapiro,56 the opinions in Dunn and Sha-
v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) (per curiam) ("Although the fifty-day registration
period approaches the outer constitutional limits in this area, we affirm.").
49. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). The Tennessee law authorized voter
registration to only those "resident[s] of this state for twelve (12) months, and of the
county wherein he may offer his vote for three (3) months." TENN. CODE ANN. sec. 2-
201 (Supp. 1970).
50. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). See supra notes 31-33 and
accompanying text.
51. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
52. Indeed, Justice Marshall's words are unequivocal:
Durational residence laws impermissibly condition and penalize the right to
travel by imposing their prohibitions on only those persons who have recently
exercised that right...
In sum, durational residence laws must be measured by a strict equal protec-
tion test: they are unconstitutional unless the state can demonstrate that such
laws are "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest."
Id. at 342.
53. See supra note 49.
54. 405 U.S. at 339. Mr. Blumstein, a law professor at Vanderbilt University, was
clearly a bona fide resident. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 331. Additionally, he brought the suit
as a test case. Id. at 361 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 336. Citizens have no constitutional right to vote, but they do have the
right "to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdic-
tion." Id. For a possible explanation of the case, see Nowak, supra note 14, at 1083-
84 (Court employed a "demonstratable basis standard rather than the compelling in-
terest standard to review the limitation of the right of voting and travel. The majority
found that the State was unable to demonstrate that the residency requirement was in
fact a rational means of promoting a state interest capable of withstanding analysis.").
56. The Court suggests that all penalties on the exercise of the right to travel are
subject to the compelling state interest test. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 634.
However, the Court then conditions this suggestion:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements
determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a
license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements
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piro mandate that durational residency requirements satisfy the
'compelling state interest" test.57
The Court subsequently modified its penalty analysis, reading Sha-
piro and Dunn for slightly less than the opinions suggested. In Me-
morial Hospital v. Maricopa County,58 the Court applied the strict
scrutiny component of equal protection analysis59 and invalidated a
waiting period requirement for non-emergency medical care for indi-
gents.' Authoring the majority opinion, Justice Marshall6' distin-
guished between migration and travel, deciding that the Constitution
protected against penalties imposed only on the right to migrate.62
Justice Marshall noted further that Shapiro did not require an impact
on the right to migrate.63 Instead, classifications merely penalizing
those recently exercising a constitutional right invoked the "compel-
ling state interest" test.' He also added that while not all waiting
may promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may
not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969). In Memorial, the Court recog-
nized this ambiguity, but side-stepped the problem. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 256-59 (1974).
57. Shapiro and Dunn suggest that if a classification penalizes the exercise of the
right to travel solely on the basis that one of the classes consists of newcomers, then
the classification must pass the compelling state interest test. See Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 342 n.12 (1972).
58. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
59. Id. at 250, 254, 262.
60. The statute provided that an indigent would not receive non-emergency "hos-
pitalization, medical care or outpatient relief' unless he had resided in the county for
a year. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-297A (Supp. 1973-1974).
61. Joining Justice Marshall on the majority opinion were Justices Brennan,
Stewart, White and Powell. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun concurred in
result. Justice Douglas wrote a separate opinion, and Justice Rehnquist dissented.
415 U.S. 250.
62. Adopting the reasoning of a federal court, Justice Marshall concluded that
-the right to travel was involved in only a limited sense in Shapiro." Id. at 255. He
associated travel with mere movement, and interpreted Shapiro as applying only to
migration. Id.
63 Justice Marshall incorrectly stated that the Court in Shapiro looked at
whether the waiting-period itself deterred migration. Id. at 257. In the portion of the
opinion Justice Marshall quotes, the Court discussed one of the proffered purposes of
the statutes and remarked that the means operated as an impermissible purpose of
discouraging the poor from entering the jurisdiction. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 629 (1969).
64. 415 U.S. at 256-57. In this case, the right to travel served as the requisite
constitutional right. Id.
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periods constituted penalties, a penalty clearly existed in this case-
the denial of a vital benefit and privilege."5
Before Memorial, the Court had appeared ready to phase out its
"penalty analysis" and examine classifications as irrebuttable pre-
sumptions, an approach discussed in Shapiro.66 In Shapiro, the
Court rejected one of the asserted justifications for the residency re-
quirement67 because the classification created an irrebuttable pre-
sumption without any factual basis. 8 The Dunn Court adopted a
similar approach toward irrebuttable presumptions,69 holding that
the equal protection clause limits when a state may employ a conclu-
sive presumption to justify a durational residency requirement.7 ° In
PVandis v. Kline,7 the Court went a step further and declared the
conclusive presumption in the University of Connecticut's non-resi-
dent tuition system an unconstitutional denial of due process.72 The
Vlandis Court held that the irrebuttable presumption arbitrarily de-
nied 73 a student an opportunity to make an individualized showing
65. Id. at 259. Here, Justice Marshall refers to governmental entitlements. Per-
haps an implicit concern in Memorial is that of protecting government created prop-
erty interests. See supra note 24.
66. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969). An irrebuttable or conclusive pre-
sumption "is one in which proof of a basic fact renders the existence of the presumed
fact conclusive and irrebuttable." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1067 (5th ed. 1979).
67. See supra notes 26, 34 and accompanying text.
68. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969).
69. The Court considered Tennessee's argument that the durational residency re-
quirement operated as an "administratively useful conclusive presumption" to test
bona fide residence. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 349-52 (1972).
70. The Court relied on Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), and found the use
of such a presumption too "crude" and "imprecise." Id. at 351.
71. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
72. Id. at 442. Connecticut created an irrebuttable presumption of non-residence
if the student's "legal address for any period of the one-year period immediately prior
to his application for admission" was outside the state. Id.
73. Connecticut offered three objectives for its policy: 1) cost equalization; 2) re-
warding for past contributions; and 3) administrative convenience. Id. at 448, 449,
451. Justice Stewart accepted the goal of achieving "cost equalization between bona
fide residents and non-residents," but added that "basing the bona fides of residency
solely on where a student lived when he applied for admission to the University is
using a criterion wholly unrelated to that objective." Id. at 448-49. Considering the
second objective, Justice Stewart quoted from Shapiro that apportionment between
new and old residents based on past contributions might lead to apportionment of
other state services. Id. at 450. Furthermore, Connecticut's interest in administrative




of bona fide residence.74
The Memorial Court never considered the irrebuttable presump-
tion approach of Vandis, 7 and the Court ultimately abandoned the
due process argument.76 The penalty analysis developed in Shapiro
and Memorial also proved difficult to use.7 7 Justice Marshall ob-
served in Memorial that the "penalty analysis" approach saddled the
Court with the task of defining the scope of a penalty.78 Indeed,
other courts wrestled with the problem, and their decisions lack uni-
formity.79 Not surprisingly, therefore, a year after its decision in Me-
74. Id. at 453. Chief Justice Burger lamented that the Court's resort to the due
process clause foreshadowed future complications:
There will be, I fear, some ground for a belief that the Court now engrafts the
"close individual scrutiny" test into the Due Process Clause whenever we deal
with something like "permanent irrebuttable presumptions .... The doctrinal
difficulties of the Equal Protection Clause are indeed trying, but today the Court
makes an uncharted drift toward complications for the Due Process Clause com-
parable in scope and seriousness with those we are encountering in the equal
protection area.
Id. at 462 (Burger, C.I., dissenting).
75. See supra notes 71-74.
76. See infra note 83 for a possible explanation for the short-lived due process
approach to durational residency requirements.
77. See supra notes 31-33, 45, 50-65 and accompanying text.
78. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974). See infra
note 79.
79. Five years after Shapiro, Justice Marshall sensed the problem with defining
the scope of "penalty." 415 U.S. at 259. He continued to use the penalty analysis,
however. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 18 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). Not surprisingly, therefore, federal courts read Shapiro differently. In Cole v.
Housing Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970), for instance, the court noted
that Shapiro left few clues as to the amount of impact on or interference with the right
to travel necessary to invoke the "compelling state interest" test. Id. at 809. While
the Cole court rejected any sort of deterrence test, it escaped the problem of defining
all durational residency requirements as penalties:
We conclude that Shapiro stands for the proposition that a rule penalizing
travel requires a justification of a compelling state interest. However, it would
seem that any durational or residency requirement would penalize persons who
have recently exercised their right to travel by denying them benefits granted to
other residents. How can this be reconciled with footnote 21 in Shapiro, ..
which says that some such requirements may be justified because they either pro-
mote a compelling state interest or "may not be penalties upon the exercise of the
constitutional right of interstate travel"?
The answer, we think, lies in the Court's concept of the right to travel. The
Court apparently uses "travel" in the sense of migration with intent to settle and
abide. Thus, laws that comparatively disadvantage persons traveling to take ad-
vantag of state benefits and then leaving are permissible under Shapiro.
Id. at 810-11 (citations and footnote omitted). The key question for the Court, there-
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morial, the Court, in Sosna v. Iowa,8" departed from its path of prior
precedent.
In Sosna, the Court8 upheld Iowa's one-year waiting-period re-
quirement in a divorce action. 2 Without applying explicitly any test
from either the equal protection or due process clauses,83 the Court
fore, was whether the requirement penalized persons for having recently exercised
their right to migrate. Id. at 811.
Other courts measured the nature of the benefit denied. See, e.g., Suffling v.
Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 259 (D. N.M. 1972), affdmem. Rose v. Bondurant, 409
U.S. 1020 (1972) (Shapiro explicitly excluded durational residency requirements for
professional licenses); Keppel v. Donovan, 326 F. Supp. 15, 20 (D. Minn. 1970) (six
month residency requirement for voting creates a penalty, although less severe than
the one in Shapiro); Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D. Ariz. 1971)
(Shapiro "specifically concerned" with the denial of basic necessities); Kirk v. Board
of Regents, 273 Cal. App.2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S.
554 (1970) (neither deterrence nor deprivation of basic necessities created by public
school tuition system). Moreover, various courts examined the "interference" with
the right to travel. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 337 F. Supp. 626, 630-33 (D. Minn.
1971) (deterrent effect or intent not required, rather an interference with the right to
interstate travel); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn. 1970), aft'd,
401 U.S. 985 (1971) (actual or hypothetical impact on interstate movement); Lane v.
McGary, 320 F. Supp. 562, 564 (N.D. N.Y. 1970) (substantiality of impact). For a
recent case focusing on the nature of the benefit denied, see Strong v. Collatos, 593
F.2d 420 (1st Cir. 1979), infra note 89.
80. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
81. Sosna is the only time Justice Rehnquist joined the majority in the major
durational residency requirement cases.
82. 419 U.S. at 408. Appellant challenged the constitutionality of the requirement
on two grounds. First, appellant argued that the law established two classes, and
discriminated against one class because it targeted "those who have recently exercised
their right to travel to Iowa." Id. at 405. Second, appellant raised a due process issue,
claiming that the requirement "denies a litigant the opportunity to make an individu-
alized showing of bona fide residence." 1d.
83. The Court abandoned the V/and/s due process approach, no doubt, for practi-
cal reasons. Professor Tushnet explains that the conclusive presumption analysis in
Plandis fell prey to doctrinal inconsistency with equal protection analysis and was
shortly thereafter discarded.
A fair interpretation of the process is that Justice Stewart mounted a peculiar
hobbyhorse in Viandis v. Kline and the liberal justices went along for the ride to
the result they favored.Unfortunately for the liberals, the inconsistency between
the 'conclusive presumption and the general equal protection doctrines made it
impossible for the former to become an established mode of analysis.
Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and theAmerican Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Schol-
arshop in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1307, 1326 (1979). See also McKay v. Horn,
529 F. Supp. 847 (D. N.J. 1981):
In the past, the Supreme Court has struck down legislation under the Due Pro-
cess clause which denies governmental benefits on the basis of a presumption not
universally true without giving the claimant an opportunity to rebut the pre-
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sustained the law as a legitimate means of protecting Iowa's inter-
ests.84 The penalty analysis developed in the previous cases85 never
entered into the opinion, while the Viandis approach succumbed to a
quibble over semantics. 6 Instead, the Court employed a balancing
approach to test the constitutionality of the statute. 7 Such judicial
craftsmanship prompted Justice Marshall, in dissent, to express con-
cern for future treatment of other durational residency
requirements."8
sumption. (Citation omitted.) It is now well-established, however, that where
. . social and economic legislation is challenged which neither creates "suspect"
classifications nor burdens fundamental rights, the proper standard of review
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is the
same as the standard applied under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
Id. at 864 (citations omitted).
84. 419 U.S. at 404-09. Justice Rehnquist distinguished between the Shapiro,
Dunn, Memorial line of cases and Sosna by incorrectly limiting the states' interest in
the former cases to matters of mere administrative and budgetary convenience. Id. at
406. In Sosna, however, he found additional state interests: 1) the state in a divorce
proceeding is not merely a grantor, but an interested party; 2) the state sought to
insulate itself from constant collateral attack of its divorce decrees; and 3) the state
sought to prevent itself from becoming a divorce mill. Id.
85. See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
86. The challengers to the statute averred that they were denied the "opportunity
to make an individualized showing of bona fide residence," and cited flandis v. Kline,
and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) as support. 419 U.S. at 405. Justice
Rehnquist responded by drawing a distinction between a "denial" and a "delay." In
the former case, a denial existed; here, however, Justice Rehnquist found only a delay
because petitioner could always file for divorce after a year. Id. at 409-10. At best,
this distinction is tenuous and merits the criticism it instigated. See, e.g., Williams v.
Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 456 (Alaska 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982).
87. Justice Rehnquist never stated what test he was applying. Facially, at least,
Justice Rehnquist employed some sort of balancing approach. Commentary on the
case illustrates the problem with the reasoning in Sosna. One commentator lamented
that "It]he test the Court was applying simply defies definition." Note, supra note 45,
at 666. See also McCoy, supra note 9, at 1014 (expressing uncertainty as to "whether
the Court has found the Shapiro-Dunn-Maricopa compelling interest requirement and
returned to some standard closer to the usual rational basis requirement"); Comment,
The Right to Travel" In Search of a Constitutional Source, 55 NEB. L. REV. 117, 126-27
(1975) (suggesting that the Court deviated from its prior position and adopted-im-
plicitly-a balancing approach); Comment,. AStrict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129, 1158 (1975) ("Justice Rehnquist in Sosna refused to announce
the applicable standard of review or even the applicable constitutional source."). One
author suggests that the test in Sosna resembles the minimal scrutiny test. Comment,
The Right to Travel and Community Growth Controls, 12 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 244, 268
(1975).
88. 419 U.S. at 419.
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Justice Marshall's fears proved unwarranted, as courts shy away
from the Sosna balancing approach.89 Indeed, many courts still ex-
amine classifications in light of the graduated model for equal protec-
tion review.9" During the interim between Sosna and Zobel, the
Supreme Court did not decide any major durational residency re-
quirement case.9 Zobel, therefore, offered the Court an opportunity
89. See Strong v. Collatos, 593 F.2d 420 (Ist Cir. 1979). In Strong, Appellants
averred that Sosna proscribed the use of a balancing test instead of the "compelling
state interest" test. The court rejected their argument, and distinguished between resi-
dency requirements for bringing a divorce action and those "residency requirements
that shut off the basic necessities of life, prevented voting, or curtailed hospital and
medical services. Id. at 423. See generally In re United States ex rel. Missouri State
High School Activities Ass'n, 682 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1982) (minimal impact on right
to travel); Benson v. Arizona State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 673 F.2d 272, 276-78
(9th Cir. 1982) (apparently accepting, though not invoking, the penalty analysis); City
of Akron v. Bell, 660 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1981) (although not applying any test, court
accepts penalty analysis with caveat that not all durational residency requirements
impose penalties); Hawaii Boating Ass'n v. Water Transp. Facilities, 651 F.2d 661,
665 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying penalty analysis, concluding "that the 'deprivation' in-
volved in this case-the failure to provide a berth in a recreational harbor at the same
rate as a resident--does not operate as a signficant 'penalty' on the right to travel").
But cf. Joseph v. City of Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (after
reviewing two-tier equal protection format, employing an intermediate tier); Williams
v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448 (Alaska 1980) (applying a balancing approach), rev'd, 102 S.
Ct. 2903 (1982).
90. For examples of federal courts discussing equal protection review, see
Nunemaker v. Harris, 679 F.2d 328, 334 n.l 1 (3d Cir. 1982); Benham v. Edwards, 678
F.2d 511, 515-16 n.9 (5th Cir. 1982); Tarter v. James, 667 F.2d 964, 969-70 (11 th Cir.
1982); Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.2d 146, 149-50 (5th Cir. 1981);
Joyner v. Dumpson, 533 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. N.Y. 1982); Dixon v. McMullen, 527 F.
Supp. 711, 719 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Arceneaux v. Edwards, 516 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. La.
1980); Joseph v. City of Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1981). These
courts implicitly apply a balancing approach only when the factual situation presents
a due process and not an equal protection issue. The following excerpt from a state
case demonstrates this approach:
Where the individual interest affected does not involve a fundamental right and
the residency requirement is not a real impediment to interstate travel, then the
governmental purpose sought to be gained by the imposition of the residency
requirement may be justified under the traditional rational-relation test and need
not be so indicated by the showing of a compelling state interest.
Lambrt v. Wentworth, 423 A.2d 527, 532 (Me. 1980) (citation omitted). The Lambert
court's use of the phrase "real impediment" illustrates at least one way a court can
implicitly escape the two-tier model. Deciding what constitutes a "real impediment"
is the same as deciding what "interest" is sufficiently important in the court's eyes that
it may impede interstate travel.
91. Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed its attitude toward state discriminatory tac-
tics against non-residents solely on the basis of non-residency or citizenship. See, e.g.,
Cabel v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978);
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to clarify its approach toward residency requirements, and equal pro-
tection analysis in general.
The Zobel Court cast aside the tests developed in prior cases. In-
stead, the Court applied a facially traditional equal protection analy-
sis" to strike down the statute. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Burger purportedly applied the minimum rationality test of the stan-
dard equal protection analysis,93 notwithstanding the appellant's fo-
cus on showing that the statute acted as a penalty on the exercise of
the right to travel.94 First, while examining the asserted objectives of
the act,95 Chief Justice Burger determined that no rational relation-
ship existed between two of the objectives and the classification.96
Second, he considered the third objective stated in the act-that of
allocating benefits according to past contributions to the commu-
nity-the only justification for retrospective application of the Alaska
plan.97 After designating this third justification impermissible, Chief
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S.
656 (1975). But cf. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322 (1979); Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371
(1978); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
92. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. This type of analysis resem-
bles the approach used during the heyday of substantive due process. See supra note
15.
93. See supra note 17 and accompanying text for a review of the minimum ration-
ality test. The Chief Justice subjected the statute to the minimal scrutiny without
deciding what the applicable standard of review would be if the statute passed this
initial stage of the test. Zobel v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. at 2309.
94. See generally Brief for Appellants at 14-28, Zobel v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. 2309.
95. The Alaska legislature included a statement of objectives with the statute:
1) to provide a mechanism for equitable distribution to the people of Alaska of
at least a portion of the state's energy wealth derived from the development and
production of the natural resources belonging to them as Alaskans;
2) to encourage persons to maintain their residence in Alaska and to reduce
population turnover in the state; and
3) to encourage increased awareness and involvement by the residents of the
state in the management and expenditure of the Alaska permanent fund.
1980 Alaska Sess. Laws Ch. 21, § 1(b), reprinted in 102 S. Ct. at 2313 n.7.
96. Chief Justice Burger held that the second and third justifications in the act
address current or future behaviors and could not justify a classification between
newer and older residents. Both the recent migrant and the long-term resident are
similarly situated with respect to the goal of encouraging persons to remain in Alaska
and to encourage increased awareness of the permanent fund expenditures. 102 S. Ct.
at 2313. Of course, one might respond by suggesting that long-term residents need
more encouragement than recent migrants because long-term residents may have a
deep-seated sense of apathy not found in new residents.
97. See supra note 95. Chief Justice Burger buttressed this point by noting that
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Justice Burger declared the distribution scheme unconstitutional.98
Concurring, Justice Brennan agreed that the past contribution ra-
tionale reached too far.99 More importantly, he would have declared
the law unconstitutional solely on the basis that it affected free inter-
state migration. 0" Reading the equal protection clause as mandating
equality of citizenship, Justice Brennan criticized the Alaska statute
for establishing degrees of citizenship.' 0 '
Concurring separately, Justice O'Connor criticized the Court for
invoking the equal protection clause, misreading Shapiro and
Viandis, and declaring Alaska's purpose illegitimate. °2 Instead, Jus-
tice O'Connor concluded that the distribution scheme burdened indi-
viduals exercising their right to migrate 3 and thus contravened the
the Alaska Supreme Court apparently came to the same conclusion. 102 S. Ct. at
2313. The Alaska court, however, found this purpose-though not compelling-per-
missible. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 459-61 (Alaska 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct.
2309.
Actually, both the Alaska Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
ignored the language in the first objective. Rewarding for past contributions was not
an "objective" of the Alaska legislature-at least according to the language it chose.
The last two stated purposes were the "objectives," while the first listed purpose was
merely the only viable means for implementing the program. See supra note 7.
98. 102 S. Ct. at 2315.
99. Justice Brennan feared the possible balkanization of states if each state
adopted a plan similar to that of Alaska's distribution scheme. Id. at 2316-17. More-
over, Justice Brennan intimated that the "past contribution" rationale may have some
importance, but measuring the contribution by a durational residency requirement
created a tenuous presumption.
In effect, then, the past-contribution rationale is so far-reaching in its potential
application, and the relationship between residence and contribution to the State
so vague and insupportable, that it amounts to little more than a restatement of
the criterion for discrimination that it purports to justify.
Id. at 2318.
100. Id. at 2317. Justice Brennan emphasized the pervasive discrimination em-
bodied in the plan. Id.
101. Id. at 2317-18. The citizenship clause in the fourteenth amendment "equates
citizenship. . . with simple residence." Id. By distributing benefits unequally to citi-
zens, Alaska, according to Justice Brennan, violated this principle. Id.
102. Id. at 2319 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
103. Practically speaking, one cannot say the Alaska plan "burdened" those who
recently exercised the right to travel. No great imposition arises from giving one a
smaller slice of a boon. In order to reach the privileges and immunities question,
however, Justice O'Connor opined that the statute infringes a fundamental right by
burdening nonresidents.
The "burden" imposed on nonresidents is relative to the benefits enjoyed by resi-
dents. It is immaterial, for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
that the nonresident may enjoy a benefit in the new state that he lacked com-
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article IV privileges and immunities clause. t°4
Justice Rehnquist dissented, admonishing the Court for aban-
doning the traditional deferential approach toward economic regula-
tions.' He observed that the Alaska plan did not discourage travel
or migration,"° and he read the majority opinion as not treating the
case as a right to travel issue."0 7 But viewing the case in traditional
equal protection terms, he disagreed with the majority's reliance on
the illegitimacy of the "past contribution" argument.10 The Court,
opined Justice Rehnquist, should only question the propriety of the
"past contribution" justification in right to travel cases and not in
traditional minimum scrutiny analysis.0 9 According to Justice
Rehnquist, the deferential aspect of equal protection analysis re-
quired only that the classification be rationally based.' 0 Otherwise,
the Court might repeat its mistakes made during the substantive due
process era."' After finding a rational basis for the Alaska plan,
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the majority necessarily read a par-
ticular economic and social policy into the fourteenth amendment-
pletely in his former state. The clause addresses only differences in treatment; it
does not judge the quality of treatment a state affords citizens and noncitizens.
Id. at 2321 n.6. After determining the applicability of the privileges and immunities
clause, Justice O'Connor focused on two questions: 1) whether nonresidents are a
peculiar source of the evil the statute is aimed at; and 2) whether a substantial connec-
tion exists "between the evil and the discrimination preached against the" nonresident
in the statute. Id. at 2321.
104. 102 S. Ct. at 2320. Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger disagreed
with Justice O'Connor's reading of the privileges and immunities clause in article IV.
See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
105. 102 S. Ct. at 2324 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the defer-
ential approach, see supra note 17.
106. 102 S. Ct. at 2324.
107. Id. at 2324 n.l. Actually, the majority opinion equates right to travel analy-
sis with equal protection review.
In reality, right to travel analysis refers to little more than a particular applica-
tion of equal protection analysis. Right to travel cases have examined, in equal
protection terms, state distinctions between newcomers and longer-term
residents.
Id. at 2313 n.6. This approach resembles the position taken by lower federal courts
prior to Shapiro.
108. 102 S. Ct. at 2324.
109. Id.
110. Id
Il 1. Id. If one accepts the objective of rewarding for past contributions, then the
rationality of the Alaska plan is apparent, even though the presumption may not be
accurate.
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the same charge levelled against the Court during the era of substan-
tive due process.' 12
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger employed an ends analysis character-
istic of the Lochner era rather than a means analysis." 3 Arguably,
the plan would have passed constitutional muster under the prior ap-
proaches.' 1 4  But instead of examining whether the distribution
scheme operated as a penalty on the exercise of the right to migra-
tion, as in Shapiro,I"5 or whether it created an unjustified conclusive
presumption, as in Vlandis, " 6 or even whether it satisfied the balanc-
ing approach in Sosna,"I7 Chief Justice Burger began the discussion
in traditional equal protection terms." 8 By declaring the end imper-
missible, however, he failed to clarify the appropriate standard of
equal protection analysis for classifications between recent migrants
and long-term residents." 9
In lieu of such analysis, the Court's holding turned on classifying
the "past contribution rationale" as an impermissible end) 20 In the
112. 102 S. Ct. at 2325.
113. See supra note 15. Rather than examining the nexus between the stated
objectives and the means employed, Chief Justice Burger held the retrospective appli-
cation of the plan unconstitutional for lack of a legitimate purpose. 102 S. Ct. at 2315.
114. Applying the penalty analysis the classification passes the test. Because the
distribution scheme also treats residents differently according to when they were born,
the classification does not distinguish solely on the basis of the exercise of the right to
travel. Alternately, the nature of the benefit denied cannot be said to deter travel,
either practically or hypothetically. Consequently, the classification does not impose
a penalty requiring the Court to invoke the compelling state interest test. For a dis-
cussion of the statute's constitutionality under a balancing approach see Note, supra
note 6; Note, supra note 11.
115. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 83-84, 87 and accompanying text.
118. 102 S. Ct. at 2312-13.
119. Through its prior decisions, the Court had created uncertainty as to what test
applied to durational residency requirements. Sosna suggested the Court would con-
sider a balancing approach. Conversely, the Court never explicitly abandoned its
penalty analysis. Summary affirmances suggested that the Court did not hold all du-
rational residency requirements penalties. The crucial question, therefore, centered
on when the Court would ask more of a statute than mere rationality. When Chief
Justice Burger said that "right to travel analysis refers to little more than a particular
application of equal protection analysis," he brought attention to the question. 102 S.
Ct. at 2312 n.6. But the Chief Justice never transformed theparticular application he
spoke of into the appropriate standard of review for durational residency
requirements.
120. 102 S. Ct. at 2314-15.
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tradition of Lewis Carroll, 2 ' the Court assumed that what it an-
nounces three times must be true.'2 2 Arguably, the prior decisions
only rejected the "contributory rationale" when searching for a com-
pelling state interest.' 23 Even accepting the Court's reading of Sha-
piro, Viandis, and Memorial, its underlying reasoning is intellectually
unsatisfying. Here, the Court assumed incorrectly that rewarding for
past contributions does not influence present or future behavior. 24
121."Just the place for a Snark," the Bellman cried,
As he landed his crew with care
Supporting each man on the top of the tide
By a finger entwined in his hair
"Just the place for a Snark. I have said it twice:
That alone should encourage the crew.
"Just the place for a Snark. I have said it thrice:
What I tell you three times is true."
L. CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK, FIT THE FIRST.
122. See supra note 121. The Court merely extracted the language from its deci-
sions in Shapiro, Memorial, and k7ands. 102 S. Ct. at 2314-15. For the initial state-
ment, see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. See also Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 266 (1974) (rejecting contributory rationale); Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,450 n.6 (1973) (relying upon Shapiro that apportionment based
on past contributions "would give rise to grave problems under the Equal Protection
Clause"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969) (apportionment of state
services on basis of past tax contributions prohibited). But cf. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429 (1980) ("State's refusal to sell to buyers other than South Dakotans is
'protectionist' only in the sense that it limits benefits generated by a state program to
those who fund the state treasury and whom the State was created to serve"); Kirtland
v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 499 (1879) ("whether the State of Connecticut shall meas-
ure the contribution which persons resident within its jurisdiction shall make by way
of taxes in return for the protection it affords them, by the value of the credits, choses
in action, bonds, or stocks which they may own, is a matter which concerns only the
people of that state, and with which the Federal government cannot rightly
interfere").
123. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. The statement in Shapiro, how-
ever, is unambiguous: "The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an apportion-
ment of state services." 394 U.S. at 633. Instead, a careful appraisal of the
contributory rationale reveals a parallel with conclusive presumption analysis. Often,
no basis in fact exists for the proposition that those being rewarded actually contrib-
uted to the state, and those being denied often do contribute to the state. See supra
note 35; Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 273 (1936) (requiring state to
show factual basis); Stevens v. Campbell, 332 F. Supp. 102, 106 (D.C. Mass. 1971)
(classification arbitrary and presumes contribution). If a state presented the factual
basis for distributing benefits, arguably the two classes would not be similarly situated
and thus the disadvantaged class could not raise an equal protection challenge.
124. Justice Brennan recognized the "presentist" argument for rewarding individ-
uals for past action:
The past actions of individuals may be relevant in assessing their present needs;
past actions may also be relevant in predicting current ability and future per-
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More importantly, by labelling the "contributory rationale" as illegit-
imate, the Court reads a particular economic and social value into the
equal protection clause.125 If the Court really means what it says
about classifications according to the length of residency, then stat-
utes such as California's roll-back tax assessment plan,126 Florida's
homestead exemption,127 or Kentucky and Indiana's durational resi-
dency requirements for alcohol sellers 128 pose troublesome questions.
Predicting how the Court might resolve such questions requires
understanding the doctrinal conflicts among the justices. The four
opinions in Zobel illustrate at least one of these conflicts. For in-
stance, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist rejected the appli-
cation of the article IV privileges and immunities clause to the Alaska
statute.' 29 Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, championed the use
of the clause as a constitutional source for protecting the right to mi-
grate. 3 ° Although agreeing that the Alaska scheme might interfere
with the right to migrate, Justice Brennan artfully dodged the privi-
leges and immunities clause.' 3 1 Consequently, five justices expressed
their intention of protecting the right to migrate, and state legislation
facially biased against newcomers might fall at the hands of judicial
review.
Not all classifications between newcomers and long-term residents
should fall prey to judicial review. Justice Brennan's concurrence
foreshadows the Court's future role in assessing residency require-
formance. In addition, to a limited extent, recognition and reward of past public
service has independent utility for the State, for such recognition may encourage
other people to engage in comparably meritorious service.
102 S. Ct. at 2318.
125. See supra note 112. The Court's decision severely limits state implementa-
tion of privitization statutes. See supra note 7.
126. See Amador Valley Joint High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978); supra note 2.
127. See Osterndorfv. Turner, 411 So. 2d 330 (Fla. App. 1982). While this com-
ment was in print, the Florida Supreme Court held the act violative of the equal
protection clause. Osterndorf v. Turner, 426 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1983).
128. See supra note 2.
129. Zobel, 102 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5, 2325 n.3.
130. Id. at 2320.
131. Id. at 2316. Justice Brennan opined that Justice O'Connor's argument was
plausible, but he found equally plausible arguments for the commerce clause and the
privileges and immunities clause in the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, he
noted "that the frequent attempts to assign the right to travel some textual source in
the Constitution seem to me to have proven both inconclusive and unnecessary." Id.
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ments in general, and the "past contribution rationale" in particular.
In short, a state may establish requirements to test bona fide citizen-
ship.'3 2 Beyond that limited goal, a state must demonstrate that its
durational residency requirement does not create an irrebuttable pre-
sumption without an empirically identifiable basis in fact. 3 '
The result in Zobel v. Williams, therefore, does not preclude states
from adopting durational residency requirements. In fact, the major-
ity opinion's reliance on equal protection analysis suggests that dura-
tional residency requirements might survive judicial scrutiny if a
legitimate and demonstratable basis exists for the classification.' 34
Nevertheless, the majority's failure to advance the applicable stan-
dard of review leaves open the possibility that the Court might de-
velop yet another test.
Sam Kalen
132. While simple residency requirements may penalize the exercise of the right
to migrate, the state is said to have a compelling interest in testing bona fide citizen-
ship. See supra note 3.
In a case decided after Zobel, the Supreme Court implicitly established a defini-
tional approach toward residency requirements. In Martinez v. Bynum, 51 U.S.L.W.
4524 (U.S. May 3, 1983), the Court explained its prior cases by drawing a distinction
between durational residency requirements and bona fide residency requirements.
"A bona fide residency requirement," the Martinez Court explained, "furthers the
substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed
only by residents." Id. at 4526. The Court also added that bona fide residency re-
quirements did not involve a "suspect" classification and thus were not governed by
strict scrutiny analysis, instead, such requirements had only to pass a rational basis
test id at 4526 n.7.
133. In other words, a state must present data illustrating that its classification
scheme is grounded "in fact" and not in an arbitrary assumption about the differences
between recent migrants and long-term residents. See supra notes 122, 123 and ac-
companying text.
134. See supra note 133. Consequently, although five justices in Zobel reaffirmed
the vitality of "right to migrate" arguments, an even larger number suggested that
these arguments could be overcome by an adequate demonstration of "reasonable-
ness" on the part of a state.
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